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Abstract
Adversarial examples are commonly viewed as a threat
to ConvNets. Here we present an opposite perspective: ad-
versarial examples can be used to improve image recogni-
tion models if harnessed in the right manner. We propose
AdvProp, an enhanced adversarial training scheme which
treats adversarial examples as additional examples, to pre-
vent overfitting. Key to our method is the usage of a sepa-
rate auxiliary batch norm for adversarial examples, as they
have different underlying distributions to normal examples.
We show that AdvProp improves a wide range of models
on various image recognition tasks and performs better
when the models are bigger. For instance, by applying
AdvProp to the latest EfficientNet-B7 [28] on ImageNet, we
achieve significant improvements on ImageNet (+0.7%),
ImageNet-C (+6.5%), ImageNet-A (+7.0%), Stylized-
ImageNet (+4.8%). With an enhanced EfficientNet-B8,
our method achieves the state-of-the-art 85.5% ImageNet
top-1 accuracy without extra data. This result even
surpasses the best model in [20] which is trained with
3.5B Instagram images (∼3000× more than ImageNet)
and ∼9.4× more parameters. Models are available at
https://github.com/tensorflow/tpu/tree/
master/models/official/efficientnet.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples crafted by adding imperceptible
perturbations to images, can lead Convolutional Neural Net-
works (ConvNets) to make wrong predictions. The exis-
tence of adversarial examples not only reveals the limited
generalization ability of ConvNets, but also poses security
threats on the real-world deployment of these models. Since
the first discovery of the vulnerability of ConvNets to adver-
sarial attacks [27], many efforts [5, 15, 29, 19, 13, 31] have
been made to improve network robustness.
In this paper, rather than focusing on defending against
adversarial examples, we shift our attention to leverag-
ing adversarial examples to improve accuracy. Previous
works show that training with adversarial examples can
∗Work done during an internship at Google.
ImageNet-A Acc. ↑
EfficientNet-B7               37.7%
+AdvProp (ours)      44.7% (+7.0%)
ImageNet-C mCE ↓
EfficientNet-B7               59.4%
+AdvProp (ours)      52.9% (-6.5%)
ImageNet Acc. ↑
EfficientNet-B7                  84.5%
+AdvProp (ours)      85.2% (+0.7%)
Stylized-ImageNet Acc. ↑
EfficientNet-B7                   21.8%
+AdvProp (ours)          26.6% (+4.8%)
Figure 1. AdvProp improves image recognition. By training
models on ImageNet, AdvProp helps EfficientNet-B7 to achieve
85.2% accuracy on ImageNet [23], 52.9% mCE (mean corrup-
tion error, lower is better) on ImageNet-C [7], 44.7% accuracy on
ImageNet-A [8] and 26.6% accuracy on Stylized-ImageNet [4],
beating its vanilla counterpart by 0.7%, 6.5%, 7.0% and 4.8%, re-
spectively. Theses sample images are randomly selected from the
category “goldfinch”.
enhance model generalization but are restricted to certain
situations—the improvement is only observed either on
small datasets (e.g., MNIST) in the fully-supervised setting
[5], or on larger datasets but in the semi-supervised setting
[21, 22]. Meanwhile, recent works [15, 13, 31] also suggest
that training with adversarial examples on large datasets,
e.g., ImageNet [23], with supervised learning results in per-
formance degradation on clean images. To summarize, it
remains an open question of how adversarial examples can
be used effectively to help vision models.
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We observe all previous methods jointly train over clean
images and adversarial examples without distinction even
though they should be drawn from different underlying dis-
tributions. We hypothesize this distribution mismatch be-
tween clean examples and adversarial examples is a key
factor that causes the performance degradation in previous
works [15, 13, 31].
In this paper, we propose AdvProp, short for Adversar-
ial Propagation, a new training scheme that bridges the dis-
tribution mismatch with a simple yet highly effective two-
batchnorm approach. Specifically, we propose to use two
batch norm statistics, one for clean images and one auxil-
iary for adversarial examples. The two batchnorms prop-
erly disentangle the two distributions at normalization lay-
ers for accurate statistics estimation. We show this distri-
bution disentangling is crucial, enabling us to successfully
improve, rather than degrade, model performance with ad-
versarial examples.
To our best knowledge, our work is the first to show
adversarial examples can improve model performance in
the fully-supervised setting on large scale datasets. For
example, an EfficientNet-B7 [28] trained with AdvProp
achieves 85.2% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet, beating its
vanilla counterpart by 0.8%. The improvement by AdvProp
is more notable when testing models on distorted images.
As summarized in Fig. 1, AdvProp helps EfficientNet-B7
to gain an absolute improvement of 9.0%, 7.0% and 5.0%
on ImageNet-C [7], ImageNet-A [8] and Stylized-ImageNet
[4], respectively.
As AdvProp effectively prevents overfitting and per-
forms better with larger networks, we develop a larger net-
work, named EfficientNet-B8, by following similar com-
pound scaling rules in [28]. With our proposed AdvProp,
EfficientNet-B8 achieves the state-of-the-art 85.5% top-1
accuracy on ImageNet without any extra data. This result
even surpasses the best model reported in [20], which is
pretrained on 3.5B extra Instagram images (∼3000× more
than ImageNet) and requires ∼9.4× more parameters than
our EfficientNet-B8.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training, which trains
networks with adversarial examples, constitutes the current
foundation of state-of-the-arts for defending against adver-
sarial attacks [5, 15, 19, 31]. Although adversarial train-
ing significantly improves model robustness, how to im-
prove clean image accuracy with adversarial training is still
under-explored. VAT [21] and deep co-training [22] attempt
to utilize adversarial examples in semi-supervised settings,
but they require enormous extra unlabeled images. Under
supervised training settings, adversarial examples are typ-
ically considered hurting accuracy on clean images, e.g.,
∼10% drop on CIFAR-10 [19] and ∼15% drop on ImageNet
[31]. Tsipras et al. [30] argue that the performance trade-
off between adversarial robustness and standard accuracy is
provably inevitable, and attribute this phenomenon as a con-
sequence of robust classifiers learning fundamentally differ-
ent feature representations than standard classifiers. Zhang
et al. [34] further propose a regularized surrogate loss to
trade accuracy for robustness.
This paper focuses on standard supervised learning with-
out extra data. Although using similar adversarial training
techniques, we stand on an opposite perspective to previous
works—we aim at using adversarial examples to improve
clean image recognition accuracy.
Benefits of Learning Adversarial Features. Many works
corroborate that training with adversarial examples brings
additional features to ConvNets. For example, compared
with clean images, adversarial examples make network rep-
resentations align better with salient data characteristics and
human perception [30]. Moreover, such trained models are
much more robust to high frequency noise [32]. Zhang et
al. [35] further suggest these adversarially learned feature
representations are less sensitive to texture distortions and
focus more on shape information.
Our proposed AdvProp can be characterized as a train-
ing paradigm which fully exploits the complementarity be-
tween clean images and their corresponding adversarial ex-
amples. The results further suggest that adversarial fea-
tures are indeed beneficial for recognition models, which
agree with the conclusions drawn from these aforemen-
tioned studies.
Data augmentation. Data augmentation, which applies a
set of label-preserving transformations to images, serves as
an important and effective role to prevent networks from
overfitting [14, 24, 6]. Besides traditional methods like hor-
izontal flipping and random cropping, different augmenta-
tion techniques have been proposed, e.g., applying mask-
ing out [3] or adding Gaussian noise [18] to regions in im-
ages, or mixing up pairs of images and their labels in a
convex manner [33]. Recent works also demonstrate that
it is possible to learn data augmentation policies automati-
cally for achieving better performance on image classifica-
tion [16, 1, 2, 17] and object detection [36, 2].
Our work can be regarded as one type of data augmenta-
tion: creating additional training samples by injecting noise.
However, all previous attempts, by augmenting either with
random noise (e.g., Tab. 5 in [15] shows the result of train-
ing with random normal perturbations) or adversarial noise
[15, 29, 13], fail to improve accuracy on clean images.
3. A Preliminary Way to Boost Performance
Madry et al. [19] formulate adversarial training as a
min-max game and train models exclusively on adversar-
ial examples to effectively boost model robustness. How-
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Figure 2. Two take-home messages from the experiments on Ima-
geNet: (1) training exclusively on adversarial examples results in
performance degradation; and (2) simply training with adversarial
examples and clean images in turn can improve network perfor-
mance on clean images. Fine-tuning details: we train networks
with adversarial examples in the first 175 epochs, and then fine-
tune with clean images in the rest epochs.
ever, such trained models usually cannot generalize well
to clean images as shown in [19, 31]. We validate this
result by training a medium-scale model (EfficientNet-B3)
and a large-scale model (EfficientNet-B7) on ImageNet us-
ing PGD attacker1 [19]—both adversarially trained models
obtain much lower accuracy on clean images compared to
their vanilla counterparts. For instance, such adversarially
trained EfficientNet-B3 only obtains an accuracy of 78.2%
on the clean images, whereas vanilla trained EfficientNet-
B3 achieves 81.7% (see Fig. 2).
We hypothesize such performance degradation is mainly
caused by distribution mismatch—adversarial examples
and clean images are drawn from two different domains
therefore training exclusively on one domain cannot well
transfer to the other. If this distribution mismatch can be
properly bridged, then performance degradation on clean
images should be mitigated even if adversarial examples are
used for training. To validate our hypothesis, we hereby ex-
amine a simple strategy—pre-train networks with adversar-
ial examples first, and then fine-tune with clean images.
The results are summarized in Fig. 2. As expected, this
simple fine-tuning strategy (marked in light orange) always
yields much higher accuracy than Madry’s adversarial train-
ing baseline (marked in grey), e.g., it increases accuracy by
3.3% for EfficientNet-B3. Interestingly, while compared to
the standard vanilla training setting where only clean im-
ages are used (marked in blue), this fine-tuning strategy
sometimes even help networks to achieve superior perfor-
mance, e.g., it increases EfficientNet-B7 accuracy by 0.3%,
achieving 84.8% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet.
The observation above delivers a promising signal—
adversarial examples can be beneficial for model perfor-
mance if harnessed properly. Nonetheless, we note that
this approach fails to improve performance in general, e.g.,
1For PGD attacker, we set the maximum perturbation per pixel =4, the
step size α=1 and the number of attack iteration n = 5.
though such trained EfficientNet-B3 significantly outper-
forms the Madry’s adversarial training baseline, it is still
slightly below (-0.2%) the vanilla training setting. There-
fore, a natural question arises: is it possible to distill valu-
able features from adversarial examples in a more effective
manner and boost model performance further generally?
4. Methodology
The results in Sec. 3 suggest that properly integrating
information from both adversarial examples and clean im-
ages even in a simple manner improves model performance.
However, such fine-tuning strategy may partially override
features learned from adversarial examples, leading to a
sub-optimal solution. To address this issue, we propose a
more elegant approach, named AdvProp, to jointly learn
from clean images and adversarial examples. Our method
handles the issue of distribution mismatch via explicitly de-
coupling batch statistics on normalization layers, and thus
enabling a better absorption from both adversarial and clean
features. In this section, we first revisit the adversarial train-
ing regime in Sec. 4.1, and then introduce how to enable
disentangled learning for a mixture of distributions via aux-
iliary BNs in Sec. 4.2. Finally, we summarize the training
and testing pipeline in Sec. 4.3.
4.1. Adversarial Training
We first recall the vanilla training setting, and the objec-
tive function is
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
L(θ, x, y)
]
, (1)
where D is the underlying data distribution, L(·, ·, ·) is the
loss function, θ is the network parameter, and x is training
sample with ground-truth label y.
Consider Madry’s adversarial training framework [19],
instead of training with original samples, it trains networks
with maliciously perturbed samples,
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
∈S
L(θ, x+ , y)
]
, (2)
where  is a adversarial perturbation, S is the allowed per-
turbation range. Though such trained models have several
nice properties as described in [35, 32, 30], they cannot gen-
eralize well to clean images [19, 31].
Unlike Madry’s adversarial training, our main goal is to
improve network performance on clean images by lever-
aging the regularization power of adversarial examples.
Therefore we treat adversarial images as additional training
samples and train networks with a mixture of adversarial
examples and clean images, as suggested in [5, 15],
argmin
θ
[
E(x,y)∼D
(
L(θ, x, y) + max
∈S
L(θ, x+ , y)
)]
.
(3)
Ideally, such trained models should enjoy the benefits from
both adversarial and clean domains. However, as observed
in former studies [5, 15], directly optimizing Eq. (3) gener-
ally yields lower performance than the vanilla training set-
ting on clean images. We hypothesize that the distribution
mismatch between adversarial examples and clean images
prevents networks from accurately and effectively distilling
valuable features from both domains. Next, we will intro-
duce how to properly disentangle different distributions via
our auxiliary batch norm design.
4.2. Disentangled Learning via An Auxiliary BN
Batch normalization (BN) [12] serves as an essential
component for many state-of-the-art computer vision mod-
els [6, 10, 26]. Specifically, BN normalizes input features
by the mean and variance computed within each mini-batch.
One intrinsic assumption of utilizing BN is that the input
features should come from a single or similar distributions.
This normalization behavior could be problematic if the
mini-batch contains data from different distributions, there-
fore resulting in inaccurate statistics estimation.
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(a) Traditional BN
(b) Proposed Auxiliary BN Design
Figure 3. Comparison between (a) traditional BN usage and (b)
the utilization of auxiliary BN. The left and right panels illustrate
the information flow in the corresponding network architectures
and the estimated normalization statistics when facing a mixture
of adversarial and clean images, respectively.
We argue that adversarial examples and clean images
have different underlying distributions, and the adversarial
training framework in Eq. (3) essentially involves a two-
component mixture distribution. To disentangle this mix-
ture distribution into two simpler ones respectively for the
clean and adversarial images, we hereby propose an aux-
iliary BN to guarantee its normalization statistics are ex-
clusively preformed on the adversarial examples. Specifi-
cally, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b), our proposed auxiliary BN
helps to disentangle the mixed distributions by keeping sep-
arate BNs to features that belong to different domains. Oth-
erwise, as illustrated in Fig. 3(a), simply maintaining one
set of BN statistics results in incorrect statistics estimation,
which could possibly lead to performance degradation.
Note that we can generalize this concept to multiple aux-
iliary BNs, where the number of auxiliary BNs is deter-
mined by the number of training sample sources. For exam-
ple, if training data contains clean images, distorted images
and adversarial images, then two auxiliary BNs should be
maintained. Ablation studies in Sec. 5.4 demonstrates that
such fine-grained disentangled learning with multiple BNs
can improve performance further. A more general usage of
multiple BNs will be further explored in future works.
4.3. AdvProp
We formally propose AdvProp in Algorithm 1 to accu-
rately acquire clean and adversarial features during train-
ing. For each clean mini-batch, we first attack the network
using the auxiliary BNs to generate its adversarial counter-
part; next we feed the clean mini-batch and the adversar-
ial mini-batch to the same network but applied with differ-
ent BNs for loss calculation, i.e., use the main BNs for the
clean mini-batch and use the auxiliary BNs for the adver-
sarial mini-batch; finally we minimize the total loss w.r.t.
the network parameter for gradient updates. In other words,
except BNs, convolutional and other layers are jointly opti-
mized for both adversarial examples and clean images. At
test time, all auxiliary BNs are dropped and we only use the
main BNs for inference.
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code of AdvProp
Data: A set of clean images with labels;
Result: Network parameter θ;
for each training step do
Sample a clean image mini-batch xc with label y;
Generate the corresponding adversarial mini-batch xa
using the auxiliary BNs;
Compute loss Lc(θ, xc, y) on clean mini-batch xc using
the main BNs;
Compute loss La(θ, xa, y) on adversarial mini-batch xa
using the auxiliary BNs;
Minimize the total loss w.r.t. network parameter
argmin
θ
La(θ, xa, y) + Lc(θ, xc, y).
end
return θ
Experiments show that such disentangled learning
framework enables networks to get much stronger perfor-
mance than the adversarial training baseline [5, 15]. Be-
sides, compared to the fine-tuning strategy in Sec. 3, Ad-
vProp also demonstrates superior performance as it enables
networks to jointly learn useful feature from adversarial ex-
amples and clean examples at the same time.
5. Experiments
5.1. Experiments Setup
Architectures. We choose EfficientNets [28] at different
computation regimes as our default architectures, rang-
ing from the light-weight EfficientNet-B0 to the large
EfficientNet-B7. Compared to other ConvNets, Efficient-
Net achieves much better accuracy and efficiency. We fol-
low the settings in [28] to train these networks: RMSProp
optimizer with decay 0.9 and momentum 0.9; batch norm
momentum 0.99; weight decay 1e-5; initial learning rate
0.256 that decays by 0.97 every 2.4 epochs; a fixed Au-
toAugment policy [1] is applied to augment training images.
Adversarial Attackers. We train networks with a mixture
of adversarial examples and clean images as in Eq. (3). We
choose Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19] under L∞
norm as the default attacker for generating adversarial ex-
amples on-the-fly. We try PGD attackers with different per-
turbation size , ranging from 1 to 4. We set the number
iteration for the attackers n=+1, except for the case =1
where n is set to 1. The attack step size is fixed to α=1.
Datasets. We use the standard ImageNet dataset [23] to
train all models. In addition to reporting performance on
the original ImageNet validation set, we go beyond by test-
ing the models on the following test sets:
• ImageNet-C [7]. The ImageNet-C dataset is designed
for measuring the network robustness to common image
corruptions. It consists of 15 diverse corruption types and
each type of corruption has five levels of severity, result-
ing in 75 distinct corruptions.
• ImageNet-A [8]. The ImageNet-A dataset adversarially
collects 7,500 natural, unmodified but “hard” real-world
images. These images are drawn from some challenging
scenarios (e.g., occlusion and fog scene) which are diffi-
cult for recognition.
• Stylized-ImageNet [4]. The Stylized-ImageNet dataset
is created by removing local texture cues while retaining
global shape information on natural images via AdaIN
style transfer [11]. As suggested in [4], networks are re-
quired to learn more shape-based representations to im-
prove accuracy on Stylized-ImageNet.
Compared to ImageNet, images from ImageNet-C,
ImageNet-A and Stylized-ImageNet are much more chal-
lenging, even for human observers.
5.2. ImageNet Results and Beyond
ImageNet Results. Fig. 4 shows the results on the Ima-
geNet validation set. We compare our method with the
vanilla training setting. The family of EfficientNets pro-
vides a strong baseline, e.g., EfficientNet-B7’s 84.5% top-1
accuracy is the prior art on ImageNet [28].
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Figure 4. AdvProp boosts model performance over the vanilla
training baseline on ImageNet. This improvement becomes more
significant if trained with larger networks. Our strongest result is
reported by the EfficientNet-B7 trained with AdvProp, i.e., 85.2%
top-1 accuracy on ImageNet.
As different networks favor different attacker strengths
when trained with AdvProp (which we ablate next), we first
report the best result in Fig. 4. Our proposed AdvProp sub-
stantially outperforms the vanilla training baseline on all
networks. This performance improvement is proportional
to the network capacity and larger networks tend to perform
better if they are trained with AdvProp. For example, the
performance gain is at most 0.4% for networks smaller than
EfficientNet-B4, but is at least 0.6% for networks larger
than EfficientNet-B4.
Compared to the prior art, i.e., 84.5% top-1 accuracy,
an EfficientNet-B6 trained with AdvProp (with ∼2× less
FLOPs than EfficientNet-B7) already surpasses it by 0.3%.
Our strongest result is obtained by the EfficientNet-B7
trained with AdvProp which achieves 85.2% top-1 accuracy
on ImageNet, beating the prior art by 0.7%.
Generalization on Distorted ImageNet Datasets. Next,
we evaluate models on distorted ImageNet datasets, which
are much more difficult than the original ImageNet. For
instance, though ResNet-50 demonstrates reasonable per-
formance on ImageNet (76.7% accuracy), it only achieves
74.8% mCE (mean corruption error, lower is better) on
ImageNet-C, 3.1% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet-A and
8.0% top-1 accuracy on Stylized-ImageNet.
The results are summarized in Tab. 1. Again, our pro-
posed AdvProp consistently outperforms the vanilla train-
ing baseline for all models on all distorted datasets. The
improvement here is much more significant than that on
Model ImageNet-C
* [7] ImageNet-A [8] Stylized-ImageNet* [4]
mCE ↓ Top-1 Acc. ↑ Top-1 Acc. ↑
ResNet-50 74.8 3.1 8.0
EfficientNet-B0 70.7 6.7 13.1
+ AdvProp (ours) 66.2 (-4.5) 7.1 (+0.4) 14.6 (+1.5)
EfficientNet-B1 65.1 9.0 15.0
+ AdvProp (ours) 60.2 (-4.9) 10.1 (+1.1) 16.7 (+1.7)
EfficientNet-B2 64.1 10.8 16.8
+ AdvProp (ours) 61.4 (-2.7) 11.8 (+1.0) 17.8 (+1.0)
EfficientNet-B3 62.9 17.9 17.8
+ AdvProp (ours) 57.8 (-5.1) 18.0 (+0.1) 21.4 (+3.6)
EfficientNet-B4 60.7 26.4 20.2
+ AdvProp (ours) 58.6 (-2.1) 27.9 (+1.5) 22.5 (+1.7)
EfficientNet-B5 62.3 29.4 20.8
+ AdvProp (ours) 56.2 (-6.1) 34.4 (+5.0) 24.4 (+3.6)
EfficientNet-B6 60.6 34.5 20.9
+ AdvProp (ours) 53.6 (-7.0) 40.6 (+6.1) 25.9 (+4.0)
EfficientNet-B7 59.4 37.7 21.8
+ AdvProp (ours) 52.9 (-6.5) 44.7 (+7.0) 26.6 (+4.8)
Table 1. AdvProp significantly boost models’ generalization abil-
ity on ImageNet-C, ImageNet-A and Stylized-ImageNet. The
highest result on each dataset is 52.9%, 44.7% and 26.6% re-
spectively, all achieved by the EfficientNet-B7 trained with Ad-
vProp. *For ImageNet-C and Stylized-ImageNet, as distortions
are specifically designed for images of the size 224×224×3, so
we follow the previous setup [4, 7] to fix the testing image size at
224×224×3 for a fair comparison.
the original ImageNet. For example, AdvProp improves
EfficientNet-B3 by 0.2% on ImageNet, and substantially
boosts the performance by 5.1% on ImageNet-C and 3.6%
on Stylized-ImageNet.
The EfficientNet-B7 trained with AdvProp reports the
strongest results on these datasets—it obtains 52.9% mCE
on ImageNet-C, 44.7% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet-A and
26.6% top-1 accuracy on Stylized-ImageNet. These are the
best results so far if models are not allowed to train with
corresponding distortions [4] or extra data [20, 31].
To summarize, the results suggest that AdvProp signif-
icantly boosts the generalization ability by allowing mod-
els to learn much richer internal representations than the
vanilla training. The richer representations not only provide
models with global shape information for better classifying
Stylized-ImageNet dataset, but also increase model robust-
ness against common image corruptions.
Ablation on Adversarial Attacker Strength. We now ab-
late the effects of attacker strength used in AdvProp on net-
work performance. Specifically, the attacker strength here
is determined by perturbation size , where larger perturba-
tion size indicates stronger attacker. We try with different 
ranging from 1 to 4, and report the corresponding accuracy
on the ImageNet validation set in Tab. 2.
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
PGD5 (=4) 77.1 79.2 80.3 81.8 83.3 84.3 84.8 85.2
PGD4 (=3) 77.3 79.4 80.4 81.9 83.3 84.3 84.7 85.1
PGD3 (=2) 77.4 79.4 80.4 81.9 83.1 84.3 84.7 85.0
PGD1 (=1) 77.6 79.6 80.5 81.8 83.1 84.3 84.6 85.0
Table 2. ImageNet performance of models trained with AdvProp
and different attack strength. In general, smaller networks favor
weaker attackers, while larger networks favor stronger attackers.
With AdvProp, we observe that smaller networks gen-
erally favor weaker attackers. For example, the light-
weight EfficientNet-B0 achieves the best performance by
using 1-step PGD attacker with perturbation size 1 (denoted
as PGD1 (=1)), significantly outperforms the counterpart
which trained with 5-step PGD attacker with perturbation
size 4 (denoted as PGD5 (=4)), i.e., 77.6% v.s. 77.1%.
This phenomenon is possibly due to that small networks are
limited by their capacity to effectively distill information
from strong adversarial examples, even the mixture distri-
butions are well disentangled via auxiliary BNs.
Meanwhile, networks with enough capacity tend to fa-
vor stronger attackers. By increasing attacker strength from
PGD1 (=1) to PGD5 (=4), AdvProp boosts EfficientNet-
B7’s accuracy by 0.2%. This observation motivate our later
ablation on keeping increasing attackers strength to fully
exploit the potential of large networks.
5.3. Comparisons to Adversarial Training
As shown in Fig. 4 and Tab. 1, AdvProp improves mod-
els for better recognition than the vanilla training baseline.
These results contradict previous conclusions [15, 29, 13]
that the performance degradation is always observed if ad-
versarial examples are used for training. We hereby pro-
vide a set of ablations for explaining this inconsistency. We
choose the PGD5 (=4) as the default attacker to generate
adversarial examples during training.
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Figure 5. AdvProp substantially outperforms adversarial training
[5] on ImageNet, especially for small models.
Comparison Results. We compare AdvProp to traditional
adversarial training [5], and report evaluation results on Im-
ageNet validation set in Fig. 5. Compared to the traditional
adversarial training, our method consistently achieves better
accuracy on all models. This result suggests that carefully
handling BN statistics estimation is important for training
better models with adversarial examples.
The biggest improvement is observed when using
EfficientNet-B0 where our method beats the traditional ad-
versarial training by 0.9%. While by using larger models,
this improvement becomes smaller—it stays at ∼0.5% un-
til scaling to EfficientNet-B5, but then drops to 0.3% for
EfficientNet-B6 and 0.1% for EfficientNet-B7, respectively.
Quantifying Domain Differences. One possible hypothe-
sis for the observation above is that more powerful networks
have stronger ability to learn a unified internal representa-
tions on the mixed distributions, therefore mitigate the issue
of distribution mismatch at normalization layers even with-
out the help of auxiliary BNs. To support this hypothesis,
we take models trained with AdvProp, and compare the per-
formance difference between the settings that use either the
main BNs or the auxiliary BNs. As such resulted networks
share all other layers except BNs, the corresponding perfor-
mance gap empirically captures the degree of distribution
mismatch between adversarial examples and clean images.
We use ImageNet validation set for evaluation, and summa-
rize the results in Tab. 3.
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
BN 77.1 79.2 80.3 81.8 83.3 84.3 84.8 85.2
Auxiliary BN 73.7 75.9 77.0 78.6 80.5 82.1 82.7 83.3
4 +3.4 +3.3 +3.3 +3.2 +2.8 +2.2 +2.1 +1.9
Table 3. Performance comparison between settings that use either
the main BNs and auxiliary BNs on ImageNet. This performance
difference captures the degree of distribution mismatch between
adversarial examples and clean images.
By training with larger networks, we observe this perfor-
mance difference gets smaller. Such gap for EfficientNet-
B0 is 3.4%, but then is reduced to 1.9% for EfficientNet-
B7. It suggests that the internal representations of adver-
sarial examples and clean images learned on large networks
are much more similar than that learned on small networks.
Therefore, with a strong enough network, it is possible to
accurately and effectively learn a mixture of distributions
even without a careful handling at normalization layers.
Why AdvProp? For small networks, our comparison
shows that AdvProp substantially outperforms the adver-
sarial training baseline. We attribute this performance im-
provement mainly to the successful disentangled learning
via auxiliary BNs.
For larger networks, though the improvement is rela-
tively small on ImageNet, AdvProp consistently outper-
forms the adversarial training baseline by a large margin
on distorted ImageNet datasets. As shown in Tab. 4, Ad-
vProp improves EfficientNet-B7 by 3.1% on ImageNet-C,
4.3% on ImageNet-A and 1.5% on Stylized-ImageNet over
the adversarial training baseline.
Model ImageNet-C [7] ImageNet-A [8] Stylized-ImageNet [4]mCE ↓ Top-1 Acc. ↑ Top-1 Acc. ↑
B6 + Adv. Training 55.8 37.0 24.7
B6 + AdvProp (ours) 53.6 40.6 25.9
B7 + Adv. Training 56.0 40.4 25.1
B7 + AdvProp (ours) 52.9 44.7 26.6
Table 4. AdvProp demonstrates much stronger generalization abil-
ity on distorted ImageNet datasets (e.g., ImageNet-C) than the ad-
versarial training baseline for larger models.
Moreover, AdvProp enables large networks to perform
better if trained with stronger attackers. For example,
by slightly increasing attacker strength from PGD5 (=4)
to PGD7 (=6), AdvProp further helps EfficientNet-B7 to
achieve 85.3% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet. Conversely,
applying such attacker to traditional adversarial training de-
creases EfficientNet-B7’s accuracy to 85.0%, possibly due
to a more severe distribution mismatch between adversarial
examples and clean images.
In summary, AdvProp enables networks to enjoy the
benefits of adversarial examples even with limited capacity.
For networks with enough capacity, compared to adversar-
ial training, AdvProp demonstrates much stronger general-
ization ability and better at exploiting model capacity for
improving performance further.
Missing Pieces in Traditional Adversarial Training. In
our reproduced adversarial training, we note it is already
better than the vanilla training setting on large networks.
For example, our adversarially trained EfficientNet-B7 has
85.1% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet, which beats the vanilla
training baseline by 0.6%. However, previous works [15,
13] show adversarial training always degrades performance.
Compared to [15, 13], we make two changes in our re-
implementation: (1) using stronger networks; and (2) train-
ing with weaker attackers. For examples, previous works
use networks like Inception or ResNet for training, and set
the perturbation size =16; while we use much stronger Ef-
ficientNet for training, and limit the perturbation size to a
much smaller value =4. Intuitively, weaker attackers push
the distribution of adversarial examples less away from the
distribution of clean images, and larger networks are better
at bridging domain differences. Both factors mitigate the
issue of distribution mismatch, thus making networks much
easier to learn valuable feature from both domains.
5.4. Ablations
Fine-grained Disentangled Learning via Multiple Aux-
iliary BNs. Following [28], our networks are trained with
AutoAugment [1] by default, which include operations like
rotation and shearing. We hypothesize these operations
(slightly) shift the original data distribution and propose to
add an extra auxiliary BN to disentangle these augmented
data further for fine-grained learning. In total, we keep one
main BN for clean images without AutoAugment, and two
auxiliary BNs for clean images with AutoAugment and ad-
versarial examples, respectively.
We try PGD attackers with perturbation size ranging
from 1 to 4, and report the best result on ImageNet in Tab. 5.
Compared to the default AdvProp, this fine grained strat-
egy further improves performance. It helps EfficientNet-
B0 to achieve 77.9% accuracy with just 5.3M parameters,
which is the state-of-the-art performance for mobile net-
works. As a comparison, MobileNetv3 has 5.4M param-
eters with 75.2% accuracy [9]. These results encourage
the future investigation on more fine-grained disentangled
learning with mixture distributions in general, not just for
adversarial training.
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
AdvProp 77.6 79.6 80.5 81.9 83.3 84.3 84.8 85.2
Fine-Grained AdvProp 77.9 79.8 82.0 83.5 83.5 84.4 84.8 85.2
Table 5. Fine-grained AdvProp substantially boosts model accu-
racy on ImageNet, especially for small models. We perform fine-
grained disentangled learning by keeping an additional auxiliary
BN for AutoAugment images.
Comparison to AutoAugment. Training with adversarial
examples is a form of data augmentation. We choose
the standard Inception-style pre-processing [25] as base-
line, and compare the benefits of additionally applying Au-
toAugment or AdvProp. We train networks with PGD5
(=4) and evaluate performance on ImageNet.
Results are summarized in Tab. 6. For small models,
AutoAugment is slightly better than AdvProp although we
argue this gap can be addressed by adjusting the attacker
strength. For large models, AdvProp significantly outper-
forms AutoAugment. Training with AutoAugment and Ad-
vProp in combination is better than using AdvProp alone.
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
Inception Pre-process [25] 76.8 78.8 79.8 81.0 82.6 83.2 83.7 84.0
+ AutoAugment [1] +0.5 +0.4 +0.5 +0.7 +0.4 +0.5 +0.5 +0.5
+ AdvProp (ours) +0.3 +0.3 +0.2 +0.4 +0.3 +0.8 +0.9 +0.9
+ Both (ours) +0.3 +0.4 +0.5 +0.8 +0.7 +1.1 +1.1 +1.2
Table 6. Both AutoAugment and AdvProp improves model per-
formance over the Inception-style pre-processing baseline on Ima-
geNet. Large Models generally perform better with AdvProp than
AutoAugment. Training with a combination of both is better than
using AdvProp alone on all networks
Attackers Other Than PGD. We hereby study the effects
of applying different attackers in AdvProp on model per-
formance. Specifically, we try two different modifications
on PGD: (1) we no longer limit the perturbation size to be
within the -ball, and name this attacker to Gradient Descent
(GD) as it removes the projection step in PGD; or (2) we
skip the random noise initialization step in PGD, turn it to I-
FGSM [15]. Other attack hyper-parameters are unchanged:
the maximum perturbation size =4 (if applicable), number
of attack iteration n=5 and attack step size α=1.0.
For simplicity, we only experiment with EfficientNet-
B3, EfficientNet-B5 and EfficientNet-B7, and report the Im-
ageNet performance in Tab. 7. We observe that all attackers
substantially improve model performance over the vanilla
training baseline. This result suggests that our AdvProp is
not designed for a specific attacker (e.g., PGD), but a gen-
eral mechanism for improving image recognition models
with different adversarial attacker.
B3 B5 B7
Vanilla Training 81.7 83.7 84.5
PGD [19] 81.8 84.3 85.2
I-FGSM [15] 81.9 84.3 85.2
GD 81.7 84.3 85.3
Table 7. ImageNet performance when trained with different attack-
ers. With AdvProp, all attackers successfully improve model per-
formance over the vanilla training baseline.
ResNet Results. Besides EfficientNets, we also experi-
ment with ResNet [6]. We compare AdvProp against two
baselines: vanilla training and adversarial training. We ap-
ply PGD5 (=4) to generate adversarial examples, and fol-
low the settings in [6] to train all networks.
We report model performance on ImageNet in Tab. 8.
Compared to vanilla training, adversarial training always
degrades model performance while AdvProp consistently
leads to better accuracy on all ResNet models. Take
ResNet-152 for example, adversarial training decreases the
baseline performance by 2.0%, but our AdvProp further
boosts the baseline performance by 0.8%.
ResNet-50 ResNet-101 ResNet-152 ResNet-200
Vanilla Training 76.7 78.3 79.0 79.3
Adversarial Training -3.2 -1.8 -2.0 -1.4
AdvProp (ours) +0.4 +0.6 +0.8 +0.8
Table 8. Performance comparison among vanilla training, adver-
sarial training and AdvProp on ImageNet. AdvProp reports the
best result on all ResNet models.
In Sec. 5.3, we show that adversarial training can im-
prove performance if large EfficientNets are used for train-
ing. However, this phenomenon is not observed on ResNet,
e.g., adversarial training still leads to inferior accuracy even
trained with the large ResNet-200. It may suggest that ar-
chitecture design also plays an important role when training
with adversarial example, and we leave it as a future work.
Pushing The Envelope with a Larger Model. Previous
results suggest AdvProp performs better with larger net-
works. To push the envelope, we train a larger network,
EfficientNet-B8, by scaling up EfficientNet-B7 further ac-
cording to the compound scaling rule in [28].
Our AdvProp improves the accuracy of EfficientNet-B8
from 84.8% to 85.5%, achieving a new state-of-the-art ac-
curacy on ImageNet without using extra data. This result
even surpasses the best model reported in [20], which is pre-
trained on 3.5B extra Instagram images (∼3000×more than
ImageNet) and requires ∼9.4× more parameters (829M vs.
88M) than our EfficientNet-B8.
6. Conclusion
Previous works commonly view adversarial examples as
a threat to ConvNets, and suggest training with adversarial
examples lead to accuracy drop on clean images. Here we
offer a different perspective: to use adversarial examples for
improving accuracy of ConvNets. As adversarial examples
have different underlying distributions to normal examples,
we propose to use an auxiliary batch norm for disentangled
learning by processing adversarial examples and clean im-
ages separately at normalization layers. Our method, Ad-
vProp, significantly improves accuracy of all ConvNets in
our experiments. Our strongest model reports the state-of-
the-art 85.5% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet without any ex-
tra data.
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